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THE EXECUTION OF SEALED INSTRUMENTS BY AN.
AGENT*
§ i. PURPOSE OF THIS ARTicLE.-The mantier of the execution
of instruments under seal, such as deeds, bonds and other solemn
writings, is of so much importance and has been so frequently
discussed, as to merit the more extended treatment, which it is the
purpose of this article to devote to it. The word "deed" herein is
used to describe all irlstruments under seal, and not merely convey-
ances of land.
It is to be observed that the .question here is not how authority to
execute sealed instruments is to be conferred, but how such an
authority is to be executed.
§ 2. MUST PURPORT TO BE MADE AND SEALED IN THE NAME OF
THE PRINCIPAL.--It is a fundamental rule in the law of agency that
in order to bind the principal by a deed executed by an agent, the
deed must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the
name of the principal. If, on the contrary, though the agent
describes himself as "agent," or though he add the word "agent" to
his name, the words of grant, covenant and the like, purport upon
the face of the instrument to be his, and the seal purports to be his
seal, the deed will bind the agent if any one and not the principal."
So, in order to enable the principal to enforce the obligation
against the other party, the same rule must be observed. For it is
well settled by the strict rules of the common law, that no person
can sue or be sued upon an instrument necessarily under seal unless
he be named therein as a party to the same.2
The rules, moreover, hereafter to be cqnsidered, which enable an
undisclosed principal to sue or be sued upoq a contract made by his
'Adapted from material collected for the forthcoming new edition of the writer's
treatise on Agency.
'Stinchfield v'. Little. i GrncaL (Me.) 231, to Am. Dec. 65; Stone v. Wood, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 453, 37 Am. Dec. 529; Lutz v. Linthicum. 8 Pet. (U. S.) t6S; Fullam v. West
Brookfield, 9 Allen (X4n.) z; Townsend v. Coming, 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 435; Briggs v.
Partridge. 64 N. Y. 3S7. -z Am. Rep. 617; Grubbs v. Wiley, 17 Miss. 29; Hopkins v.
Mehaffy, is S. & R. (Penn.) :36; Webster v. Brown, 2 Rich. (S.C.) N. S. 428; Echols
v. Cheney,2 *8 Cal. IS7; Morrison v. Bowman. 29 Cal. 337; City of Providence v. Miller,
I: R. I. 27a: Elwell v. Shaw. t6 Mass. 42. 8 Am. Dec. 126; Brinley v. Mann. 2 Cuih.
(Mss.), 337, 48 Am. Dec. 669; Combe.s Case, 9 Co. 76; Fowler v. Shearer. 7 Mass. 14;
Carter v. Chaudron, ai Ala. 72; Bogart v'. De Bussy. 6 Johm. (N. Y.) 94; Martin v.
Flowers. 8 Lelta (Va.) :$8, and see cases cited in following sections.
'Buffalo Catholic Institute v. Bitter. 87 N. Y. 25o; McColgan v. Katz. a9 N. Y. Misc.
136. 6o N. Y. Supp. 29t; Loeb v. Barris, So N. J. 1. 382. 13 At. 602; Harms v. McCor-
mick, 13a Il 304, 22 N F. St. See .:o Potter V. Ba M . 3S Mo. App. 4t)
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agent, have, as will be seen, no application to instruments under
seal.
3
The general rule, however, while well settled, is highly technical
in its nature, being founded upon the common law theories of the
effect of a seal, and like other rules based purely upon these theories,
has encounte-red a strong tendency in. recent cases to make the mere
presence of a seal subordinate to the evident intention of the parties.4
§ 3--- RULE DIFFERENT'IN TEXAS.-A different rule seems to
prevail in Texas. There, it is held not to be essential that the agent
shall refer to his power, and he may make the deed' in his own
name.5 "If the grantor has no estate in the land which can pass by
the deed, but has a power to convey the title of another, his act will
be referred. to his power because the purchaser will be supposed to
have bought in reliance on it." So it is held, that if the attorney
refers to one power which is invalid, but he, has another valid power
not referred to, he will be presumed to hav acted under the latter.6
Whether. when he acts, without reference to his power he is to be
deemed to be acting in ptrsuance of it or independently >f it, and
on his own account, seems to be a question of fact to be determined
in view of all the circumstances of the case.7
§ 4. - RULE CHANGED BY STATUTE IN A FEW STATs.-In a
few of the States, the general rbule has been changed by statutes,
which in substance provide that the fact that the attorney is named
as the grantor or that he signs instead of the principal shall, not
prevent the taking effect of-the deed as the deed of the principal
where that appears to have been the intention of the parties.'
3 Lenney v. Finley, X8 Ga. 718, 45 S. E. 593; Badger Silver Mining Co. v. Drake.
88 Fed. 48; .Farrar v. Lee, 1o App. Div. 130, 41 N. Y. Supp. 672; Benham v. Emery, 46
Hun 156; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. %,. Smith, 25 Ill. App. 471.
'See remarks of HENRY, J., in McClure v. Herring, 7o AMo. zS, 35 Am. Rep. 404.
Thus in Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Pinclard, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 671, 23 S. V.
7-'0, 1o1, it is said, "The execution of a power by the attorney in his own name is at
common law invalid; but that rule does not now, nor did it obtain in this state when
the act in question was passed. Under the law of this state a power may be executed by
the attorney without reference to his authority. Our law, in this particular at least,
dispenses with the technical requirements of the common law; and if the attorney has the
power to convey, the conveyance is binding upon the principal, and conveya his title,
though the conveyance be made without reference to him. Hough v. Hill, 47 Tex. 148;
Rogers -.. Bracken. i5 Tex. 564; Link v. Page, 72 Tex. 592." See also, Hill v. Conrad,
91 'rex. 341. 43 S. W'. 789; Pool v. Foster's Heirs (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. V. 923;
Rye v. Petroleum Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 95 S. W. 622.
Hough -'. Hill, snpra; Link v. Page, supra.
'Thus in Hill -'. Conrad, supra. where the agent in making the conveyance declared-
himself to be the owner and referred to a conveyance to himself, it was held that his deed
could not'be sustained a* an execution of the power.
5 AINE [1883], p. 6o, § 15.-Deeds and contracts, executed by an authorized agent
ki a person or a corporation in the name of his principal, or in his own 'name for his
lrincipal, are in law the deeds and contract, of %,sch principal.
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5. -- Erimc oF STATUTES ABOLSHING SEALS OR MAKIG
THEM UNNECESSARY.-In several of the States, moreover, the rules
affecting" sealed instruments generally have been more or less
modified by statute. Thus in Minnesota where the statute provides
that "the use of private seals on written contracts is hereby abolished,
and the addition of a private seal to an instrument in writing shall
not, affect its character in any respect,' it was held that all the,
differences theretofore existing in the law between sealed and
unsealed instruments were abolished and that notwithstanding the
presence of a seal, an undisclosed principal could be ,charged upon
parol evidence of his existence.'
On the other hand, in Texas, where the statute declares that no,
private seal shall be necessary to the validity of any contract, bond
or conveyance, "nor shall'the addition or omiscion of a seal or scroll
in any way affect the force and effect o the sdme," it was held that
this statute had not changed the rule.1
ORo (R. S. 1 4 1zo).-No deed of real estate executed by any person acting for
another, under a power of attorney duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, shall be
held to be invalid or defective because he is named therein, as such attorney. as the
grantor instead of his principal; nor because his name. as such attorney, is subscribed
thereto, instead of the name of the principal; nor because the certificate of acknowledg-
went, instead.of setting forth that the deed was acknowledged by the principal, by bin
sttorney, sets forth that it was acknowledged by te person who executed It, as such
attorney; but all such deeds so executed shall be as, valid and effutual, in all respects.
within the authority conferred by such powers of attorney, as if they had been executed
by the principals of such attorneys, in their own proper persona.
PzxNsY.VAxxA (Purdon's Digest of Stat.. 13th ed.. p. 376, 3 8).-Whenever any deed
of conveyance or other instrument of writing has been heretofore executed or acknowl-
edged, or both under any power sufficiently authorizing the same, which power shall have
been recited in said deed or other Instrument, shall have been informally executed by
an attorney. in his own name. feciting his authority, instead of being executed in the
name of the principal or principals, such deed or instrument shall he taken to be of the
same validity and effect as if executed in the name and behalf of the principal or prin.
cipals. as a p2riy or parties thereunto.
Tatzxxssh (Shan. Code. 3 3679).-Instruments in relation to real or personal prop.
erty, executed by an agent or attorney, may be signed by such agent or attorney for his
principal, or by writing the name of the principal bi him as agent or attorney, or-by
simply writing hts own name or his principal's name, if the instrument on its face shows
the character in which it iz intended to be executed.
See McCreary v. MeCorkle (Tenn. Ch.). 54 S. W. 53.
V&&otwia (Code. I z 4 z6).-If, in a deed made by one as attorney in fact for another,
the words of conveyance or the signature be in the name of'the attorney, it shall be to
much the principal's deed as if the words of conveyance or the siguature were In the
name of the principal by the attorney, if It be manifest on the face of the deed that it
should be construed to be that of the principal to give effect to its intent.
WaLT VIAtZIRA (Ch. 71. 3).-If in a deed made by one as attorney in 'fact for
another, the words of conveyance or the signature be in the name of the attorney, It
shall be as much the principars deed as If the words of conveyance or the signature were
in the name of the principal by the attorney, if it be manifest on the face of the deed
that it should be construed to be that of the principal to give effect to its intent
9 Strecter v. Janu. go lna. 393. 96 N. W. is 2.' To same effect is Gibbe7,. Dickson,
33 Ark. 107.
is Sanger v. Warren, 9 t Tex. 47, 44 S. W. 477. See also. Jones V.' Morris, 6t
Ala. S24.
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§ 6. - How WHERE INSTRUMENT VALID WITHOUT A SEAL.
-Whether the rule excluding parol evidence to charge the real
principal should apply where the contract though happening to be
under seal, was not one to whose validity'a seal was essential, is a
question upon which the authorities are not entirely uniform. It is
held in some cases that the evidence is as admissible under such
,circumstances as though no seal were in fact attached;" but in other
cases it is held that the rule of exclusion applies unless the interest
of the principal appears upon the face of the contract or unless the
principal has ratified it and accepted the benefits of it."§ 7. INSTRUMENT MAY BIND NEITHER PRINCIPAL NOR AGENT.
-It does not necessarily follow, of course, that either the principal or
the agent must always be bound upon the instrument. It may be
so executed that neither will be bound. Thus, if the covenants are
clearly the covenants of the principal, but the agent signs in his own
name, and appends his own seal, neither the principal nor the agent
will ordinarily be liable upon the instrument: the principal, because
he has not signed, and the agent, because he has not covenanted.1
For similar reasons, the reverse of the situation will be subject to the
sapie rule, that is, where the grants and covenants are dearly those
of the agent only, but the signature and seal are those of the prin-
cipal."4 In general, as will be seen hereafter, the agent- cannot be
liable upon the instrument itself unless it contains apt words to bind
him personally; though" in many cases, as will be seen, he will be
liable upon an express or implied warranty of authority.
Courts have, however, in several cases declared that, ut res agis
twleat. quan peeRal, they would, where the principal could not be
held, lean towards a construction which would make the agent
,personally liable."§ 8. - OR BE SIMPLY INOPERATIVE AS CONVEYANCE-AGENT'S
LIABILITY ON COVENANTS-ESTOPP4L.-The instrument may also in
many cases be simply'inoperative, as a conveyance. Thus, where the
agent undertakes in his own name to convey or lease that which
clearly belongs to his principal, the conveyance or lease will be of no
HStowell r. Eldred, 39 Wis. 6:4; Kirschbon v. Bonze!l 67 Wis. 74. 9 N. W. 97.
Lncaster v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 153 Pa. 427, 26 At. aS.
ISmith r. Pierce, 4s App. Div. 625. 60 N. Y. SUpp. 1o1; Schaeffer v. Henkel y5
N. Y. 378; Briggs t. Partridge. 64 N. Y. 3S7. zt Ai. Rep. 617; Simpson V. New York.
etc., R. Co.. 51 N. Y. Super. 419. Comp2re Rand v. Moulton, 72 N. Y. App. Liv. 236. 76
N. Y. Supp. 174.
11Whitfor4 r. Laldler, 94 N. Y. 145.46 Am. Rep. 239; Belas v. Hays. s Serg. & R(Pa.) 427; Hopkins V. Mehaffy, it S. & R. (Pa.) z26;.Neifeld v. Beidler, 37 IL. App
34; Abbey V. Chase. 6 Cush. (MaLs.) S4; Ellis v,. Pulsifer. 4 Allen (Mi.) s65; Townsend
v. Corning. 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 435; Morrison r. Bowman. 29 Cal. 337.
1, Steele v, McElroy, z Sneed (Tenn.) 34t. But compare cases eited in r 3. poi.
"ASee Hall v,. Cockrell. 28 Ala. $o7.
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effect as such and will not support the agreement of the other party
to pay the purchase price or rent fherein provided for."6 Where,
however, the covenant though made by the. agent, is that the prin-
,cipal will convey, such a covenant is valid and furnishes a good
consideration for the agreement of the opposite party to pay.
17
But though the instrument may be invalid as a conveyance, the
agent may be liable upon any of the covenants contained in it, which
may subsist without a transfer of the title.18
The agent's personal covenant in such a .case may, it is held,
operate by way of estoppel to prevent the agent's setting up 4
subsequently acquired title to the same premises, " but he is not
estopped by covenants made in the principal's name.
20
§ 9. How QUESTION DEraMINzD.-In determining whether the
deed is the deed of the principal, regard may be had, First, to .the
*party named. as grantor. Is the deed stated to be made by the prin-
cipal or by some other person? Secondly, to the granting clause.
Is the principal or the agent the person who purports to make the
grant? Thirdly, to the covenants, if any. Are these the covenants
of the principal? Fourthly, to the testimonium clause. Who is it
-who is to set his name and seal in testimony of the grant? Is it the
principal or the agent? And Fifthly, to the signature and seal.
Whose signature and seal'are these? Are they those of the principal
or of the agent?
If updn such an analysis the deed does not upon. its face purport
to be the deed of the principal, made, signed, sealed and delivered in
his name and as his deed, it cannot take effect as such.
§ 10. SAME SUBJECT-NOT ENOUGH THAT THE AGENT IS
DEscRIBED AS SucH.-It is not enough that -the agent was in fact
authorized to make the deed, if he has not acted in the -name of the
principal. Nor is it sufficient that he describes himself in the deed
as acting by virtue of a power of attorney or otherwise, for, or in
behalf, or as attorney, of the principal, or as a committee, dr as
1" First Balptist Church v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 77 N. E. 778; Murray v. Armstrong,
ix Mo. 2o9; Potter 1. Bassett, 35 Mo. App. 4r7; Bogart v. De Bussy, 6 Johns. (N. Y.)
94; Frontin v. Small, 2 Ld- Ray. 1418; Jones v. Morris. 61 Ala. Sil; Fisher v. Salmon,
1 Cal. 413, 54 Am. Dec. 297; Echols v. Cheney, 28 Cal. r57; Casey v. Lucas, 2 Bush
(Ky.) -57; Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. i8; Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126;
Holmes v. Carman, x Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 408; Locke v. Alexander, 2 Hawks (N. C.)
i55, xx Am. Dec. 75o.
"F Spencer v. Field, i0 Wend. (N. Y.) 88, distinguishing Bogart v. De Bussy, supfa,
and Frontin v. Small, .- pro.
is Lutz v'. Linthicum, 33 U. S. (8 Pet.) i6S; Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. 495, io Am.
Dec. 169; Sumner. v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162. But see Locke v. Alexander, 2 Hawks
(N. Car.) i5S, ii Amer. Dec. 75o.
39 North v. Henneberry, 44 Wis. 3o6; Heard v. Hall, x6 Pick. (Mass.) 457..
"Kern v. Chalfant, 7 Minn. 487; Smith v. Penny, 44 Cal. 16T.
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trustee of a corporation, etc.; for these expressions are but descrip-
lio persond, and if in fact he has acted in his own name and set
his own hand and seal, the causes of action theren accrue to and
'against him personally and not to or against the principal, despite
these recitals.22
But at the same time, no set form of words is necessary. The
deed must be in the name, and purpolt to be the act and deed,
of the principal; but whether such is the purport of the instrument,
must be determined from its general tenor, and not from any par-
ticular clause. Such construction must be given, in this as well as
in other questions arising on conveyances, as shall make every parL
of the instrument operative as far as possible; and when the inten-
tion of the parties can be discovered, such intention should be carried
into effect, if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.2
Thus in a leading English case, it is said by GROSF, J.: "There is
no particular form of words required to be used, provided the act be
in the name of the principal, for where is the difference between
signing J. B. by M. W., his attorney, which must be admitted to be
good, and M. W. for J. B? In either case, the act of sealing and
delivering is done in the name of the principal and by his authority.
Whether the attorney put his name first or last cannot affect the
validity of the act done."2  The particular illustration used here,
however, is not a very happy one; because, as will be seen,2u the
form "M. W. for J. B." is not always free from difficulty.
2 Stincbfield v. Little, I Greenl. (Me.) 231, o Am. Dec. 65; Fowler v. Shearer. 7
Mass. 14; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595; Tucker v. Bass,.S Mass. t64; Taft v. Brew-
ster, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 334, 6 Am. Dec. 280; Lutz v. Llnthicum, 8 Pet. (U. S.) S65;
Fullam v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.) :; Duval v. Craig, a WheaL (U. S.) 45;
Deining v. Bullitt, i Blackf. (Ind.) 241; White v. Skinner, :3 Johns. (N..Y.) 307.
7 Am. Dec. 38:; Quigley v. DeHaas, 82 Penn. St. 267; Briggs v. Partridge. 64 N. Y.
357,. a% Am. Rep. 617; Henricus v. Englert. 137 N. Y. 488. 33 N. E. 5so; Kierated
V. Orange, etc.,. R. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 343. 25 Am. Rep. zg; Sargent v. Webster, 13
Metc. (Mass.) 497. 46 Am. Dec. 743; Endsley v. Strock, So Mo. So8; Jones v. Morris.
61 Ala. Si8; Banks v. Sharp, 6 J. . Marsh (Ky.) :8o; Locke v. Alexander. a Hawk.
(N. C.) t55, it Am. Dec. 75o; Scott v. MeAlpin, N. C. Term Rep. SS, 7 Am. Dem.
703; Bellas %,. Hays, S Serg. & R. (Penn.) 427, 9 Am. Dec. 385; Fisher v. Salmon,
' Cal. 413. 54 Am. Dec. 297; Welsh v. Usher, a Hill Ch. (S. C.) 167, 29 Am. Dec. 63;
Buffalo Catholic Institute v. Bitter, 87 N. Y. 250; Willis V. Bellamy. s2 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 373; Sheridan v. Pease. 93 Ill. App. 2t9; Home Liblery Ase'n v. Witherow, So IlL
App. :z7; Jackson v. Roberts, 9S Ky. 410. 25 S. W. 879; De Bebian v. Gola, 64 Md.
a62, a: At. 275.
n Hale v. Woods, to N. H. 470, 34 Am. Dec. :76; Jackson v. Blodge, :6 Johns.
(N. Y.) 172; Bridge v. Wellington, i Mass. -zg; Davis v,. Hayden, 9 Mass. 514; Hatch
v. Dwight, 17 Maw. z89, 9 Am. Dec. 147; Magiill v. Hinsdale. 6 Conn. 464 a, z6 Am.
fec. 70; Hovey v. Magill, 2 Conn. 68o.
U Wilks v. Back, 2 East 142. See the criticism on this language of Goon, J., by
David Hoffman, Esq.. in 3 Am. Jur., at p. 82. Ct seq.
3 See Dolan v. Alley. 153 Mass. 380, 26 N. E. 989; King v. Handy, 2 Ill. App, zla;
Offutt v. Ayers, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 356; Dawson r% Cotton, 26 Ala. 59:.
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§ 11. S^A SuBjFr-IuusT'rAToNs.-Thus where a deed was
executed by an agent in the following form, "Know all men, etc.,
that I, Josiah Little, of, etc., by virtue of a vote of the Pejebscot
Proprietors, passed, etc., authorizing and appointing me to give and
execute deeds for and in behalf of said proprietors, for and in consid-
eraion of the sum of thirty-seven pounds to me in hand paid by
Thomas Stinchfield. of, etc., the receipt whereof I do hereby
acknowledge, have given, granted, released, conveyed and confirmed
unto him, the said Thomas Stinchfield, his heirs and assigns, two
hundred acres, etc. To have and to hold, etc., hereby covenanting
in behalf of said proprietors, their respective heirs, executors and
administrators, to and with the said T. S., his heirs and assigns, to
warrant, confirm and defend him and them in the possession of the
said granted premises, against the lawful claims of all persons what-
soever. In testimony that this instrument shall be forever hereafter
acknowledged by the said proprietors as their act and deed and be
held good and valid by them, I, the said Josiah Little, by virtue of
the aforesaid vote, do hereby set my hand and seal this day, etc."
Signed "Josiah Little, Seal," it was held to be the deed of Josiah
Little and that he, and not the Pejebscot Proprietors, was liable upon
the covenans.2S
So where Jonathan Elwell executed to Joshua Elwell a power
of attorney to convey the lands in question, and the latter, purporting
to act in pursuance of it, executed a deed of the land, in which, after
reciting the power, he proceeded: "Now know ye that I, the said
Joshua, by virtue of the power'aforesaid, in consideration, etc., do
hereby bargain, grant, sell and convey unto the said (grantees) to
have and to hold, etc., and I do covenant with the said (grantees)
that I am duly empowered to make the grant and conveyance afore-
said; that the said Jonathan at the time of executing said power was,
and now is, lawfully seized of the premises, and that he will warrant
and defend the same, etc. 'In testimony whereof, I have hereunto
set the name and seal of the said Jonathan this day, etc.," and signed
"Joshua Elwell" and seal, the deed w.s held not to be the deed of
Jonathan. 2'
§ 12. And again where one of two deeds which purported to be
made by "New England Silk Company, a corporation, by Christo-
pher Colt, Jun., their treasurer," was attested: "In witness whereof,
I, the said Christopher Colt, Jun., in behalf of said company, and as
their treasurer, have hereunto set my hand and seal," was signed and
sealed "Christopher Colt, Jun., treasurer, New England Silk Com-
"6Stich6eld v. Uttle (iSai). z Gmeenl. (Me.) as:. to Am. Dec. 65.
"Elwell v. Shaw (1819). 26 Msam. 42. 8 Am. Dec. %:6.
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pany," and the acknowledgment was to the effect that "Christopher
Colt, Jun., treasurer, etc., acknowledged the above instrument to be
his free act and deed," and the other deed was like the first except
that Colt was therein described as "treasurer of New England Silk
Company, and duly authorized for that purpose," the court held
each of them to be inoperative to convey the title of the Silk Conn-
pany. In both of these deeds, as will be noticed, the principal was
properly named as grantor but they were signed add sealed by the
agent in his own name. "Both of these deeds," said Judge MzrcALP,
"were executed by C. Colt, Jun., in his own name, were sealed with
his seal, and' were acknowledged by him as his acts and deeds. In
one of them, it is -true, he declared that he acted in behalf of the
company, and as their treasurer; and in the other he declared
himself to be their treasurer, and to be duly authorized for the
purpose oi executing it.- But this Was not enough. He should have
executed the deeds in the name of the company. He should also
have affixed to them the seal of the company, and have acknowledged
them to be the deeds of the company."I T
- § r3. Where, however, although the agent was named in the
instrument as the party, the deed was properly signed in the name of
the principal, it was given effect as the deed of the principal, and not
of the.agent.28 In this case a lease was made commencing as follows:
"This indenture, made this 17th day of April, A. D. z869, between
Daniel R. Brant, of the city of Chicago, party of the first part, and
Edward F. Lawrence, president of the Northwestern Distilling
Company, of the same place, party of the sec'ond part." Through-
out the lease the parties were spoken of as persons and the covenants
were personal covenants, and the instrument concluded 2(s follows:
"In testimony whereof, the said parties have hereunto set their
it Brinley v. Mann (1848), 2 Cush. (Mass.) 337, 48 Am. 'bc. 66g. Compare Haven
C.. Adams, 4 Allen (Mass.) 80.
Where a deed was in form the deed of Stephen Smith [the principal) from the begin.
ning to the end of the testimonfum clause, but was signed "Stephen Henry Smith,
attorney in fact of Stephen Smith," it was held not to be the deed of Stephen Smith;
Morrison v. Bowman, 29 (.al 337.
"Northwestern Distflling Co. v. Brant (1873), 69 1l. 6s8. iS Am. Rep. 63s. See
also to the same effect Shanks v. Lancaster (848), s Gratt. (Va.) ,to. so Am. Dec. so$;
Butterfield v. Beall (i8sr), 3 Ind. 203. Compare Hancock v. Younker, 83 IlL sol.
But where an agreement for the building of lodge rooms ran between "G. V. S. onthe oQe part and S. M. M., D. S. H., A. R. D., committee for Union Chapter No. i8,
and W. S. S., S. L. G.. N. K.. committee for Jackson Lodge No. 68," and "the before
named committee on behalf of said Chapter and Lodge obligate themselves to pay." and
1vas signed "G. M. S. [L. S.); Union Chapter No. t8 [L S.], by S. M. M., D. S. H..A. R. D., committee; Jackson Lodge No. 68 [L S.], by W. S. S.. L S. G.. N. K.,
committee," it was held that the agreement was between G. M. S. a,. the members of
the committees personajlly, and that the latter might therefore sue for its breach: Seele
r. McElroy r Sneed (Tenn.) 342-
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hands and seals the day and year first above written. D. R. Brant.
ISeal.] Northwestern Distilling Co. [Seal.]. By Edward
Lawrence, President."
So, where a deed reading "Know all men by these presents that
the West Kansas Land Company, by Solomon Houck, President,
and Theodore S. Case, Secretary, * * * has granted," etc., was
signed "Solomon Houck, Presiderit [Seal], Theodore S. Case,
Sect'y [Seal], W. K. Land Co. [Seal]," it was held to be the deed
of the company."
§ 14. SAME SunJEcz-FURTHER ILLUSTRATIONS.-SO where a
manufacturing company by vote had authorized one Arthur*W.
Magill to make a deed of the real estate of the company, and he, in
pursuance of the authority, executed a deed, of which the granting
part was as follows: "Arthur W. Magill, agent for the Middletown
Manlfacturing Company, being empowerei by vote," etc., "for and in
behalf of said company," etc., "do give, grant," etc., the covenant
being: "I do hereby covenant for and in behalf of said company," etc.
"that said Middletown Manufacturing Company is well seized," etc.,
.and I do also bind the said Middletown Manufacturing Company to
warrant and defend," etc., and the conclusion being as follows: "In
witness whereof, I have hereto, for and in behalf of said Middletown
Manufacturing Company, set my hand and seal at Middletown, this
29th day of March, A. D. 1817. Arthur W. Magill [L. s.], agent
for the Middletown Manufacturihg Company," it was held that this
was the deed of the company and not of the agent.
3 0
And again, where the terms 'of the conveyance were: "I, Daniel
King, as well for myself as attorney for Zachariah King, do for
myself and the said Zachariah, remise, release and forevir quit-
claim" the premises, "together with all the estate, right, title, inter,.s*t,
use, property, claim and demand whatsoever, of me, the said Daniel,
and said Zacha ian, which we now have, or heretofore had at any
time, in said premises. And we, the said Daniel and Zachariah, do
hereby, for ourselves, our heirs and executors, covenant that the
premises are free of all incumbrance and that the grantee may
quietly enjoy the same without any claim or hindrance from us or
any one claiming under us, or either of us. In witness whereof, we
the saidDaniel for himself and as attorney aforesaid, have hereunto
set our hands and seals," etc., and signed "Daniel King" and "Daniel
King, attorney for Zachariah King, being duly authorized as appears
of record," with seals affixed to each signature, it was held that the
grant con~leyed the title of both."
0 City of Kansax r. Hannibal. et.., R. R. Co. (1883), 77 -Mo. ISo.
Mtagll v. Hinsdale (827), 6 Con;. 464 0. 26 Am. Dec. 70.
aHale V. Woods (1839), 10 N. H. 470. 34 Am. Dec. 176; citing Wilks V'. Back (1802),
a Mt v4s, and o ntQgonry t'. Dorton (383S), 7 N. H. 484.
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§ 15. So where the deed of the-land of T. and S., his wife, was
drawn as follows: "I., H., for myself, and as attorney for T. and S.,
by their letters of attorney under their hands and seals, in consider-
ation, etc., to us paid by L., do sell and convey to L., etc. And we
the said T. and S. do covenant, etc. In witness whereof, I., H., in
my own right have hereunto set my hand and seal, and as attorney
for said T. and S. have hereunto set their hands and seals," and was
signed "H. [L. s.] T. [i,. s.] S. [L. s.]. By H., their attorney in
fact," it was held that the deed was that of T. and his wife S., and
not of the agent H."
But where A. gave to his wife B. a power of attorney to execute a
deed of land and she made the deed in the following'form: "Know
ye that I, B., of, etc., as attorney to A., pf, etc., in consideration, etc.,
have granted, etc. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my
hand and seal. B. [Seal]," the court held that it was not the deed
of A.32 "
§ 16. SAME SUBJZCT-FURTHER ILLUsTRATIONS-Dactp'o
PFzsoNAz-Where the covenants are clearLy personal, the mere
addition of the word "agent," ':trustee," etc.; will not, as has been
stated, change their character.
Thus where a bond was executed by certain persons, who signed
and sealed the same as individuals, but added "Trustees of the
Baptist Society of the Town of Richfield," the court said: "The
bond must be considered as given by the defendants in their indi-
vidual capacities. It il not the bond of the JBaptist church; and if
the defendants are not bound the church certainly is not, for the
church has not contracted either in its corporate name or by its seal
The addition of 'Trustees' to the names of the defendants is, in this
case, a mere descriptio personcarum."."
And for the same reason, where A., B., C. and others, "trustees
of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Jacksonville, their successors
and assigns," executed a bond, binding themselves, their heirs,
executors and administrators, and signed it in their individual names,
they were held personally liable.35
§ 17. So, where a contract to convey recited that it was made
between W. of the first part and F., president of the second part,
and was signed and sealed "F., Pres. of Buffalo Catholic Inst." it
was held, that the contract was that of F. and not of the corpor-
" McClure v. Herring (3879). 70 Mo. I8, 35 Am. Rep. 404. To ti, effect
91kanks v. Lancaster (1848). S Gratt. (Va.) zzo, So Am.. Dec. OS&
3Fowler v. Shearer (8Ro). 7 Mass. IS.
"
4Taft v. Brewster 8ts). 9 John. (N.Y.) 334. 6 Am. Dec. *ft. See Fullsm .
West Brookfield (1864), 9 Allen (Mau.Y s.T Dayton v. Warne (z881). 43 N. J. L. 6SO.
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ation; and that the corporation could not sue on the instrument in
its own name."
So, where a lease-under seal describes the lessor as "H. B., agent
of M. L.," and it is signed "H. B., agent," with his seal, the words
"he" and "his" being used in all the terms and covenants, naming
the party of the first part, a declaration in the name of M. L. is bad,
on demurrer.$?
§ i8. SAME SUBJ3CT-WUAT FoRM SuFFmCET.-Where a
lease purporting to be made by Mussey, was signed "John Hammond
for B. B. Mussey, (Seal)" it was held that it was well executed as
the lease of Mussey. Said the court: "The defendant does not
deny Ha.amond's authority, but takes the ground that the lease is
not the deed of Mussey but of tammond. And the common
learning is relied on, to wit, that when a deed is executed by attor-
'ney, it must be the act of the principal, done and executed in the
principal's name. The only question is, What is an execution of a
deed, by an attorney, in the name of the principal? We understand
the execution of a deed to be the signing, sealing and delivery of it.
These must be done in the name of the principal by the hand of the
attorney. When the signing and sealing are in the name of the
principal, the delivery will be presumed to have been so, unless the
contrary is proved. But however clearly the body of the deed may
show an intent that it shall be the act of the principal, yet unless it
is executed by his attorney for him, it is not his deed, but the deed
of the attorney or of -no one:3' The most usual and approved form
of executing a deed by attornej is by his writing the name of the
principal and adding 'by A. B. his attorney'.or 'by his attorney A. B.
But this is not the only form of execution which will make the deed
the act of the prificipal. In Wilk's v. Back,; M. Wilks, attorney
for J. Browne, executed a deed for himself and Browne in this
form: 'Mathias Wilks' (Seal); 'For James Browne, Mathias
$$Buffalo Catholic Inst. r. Bitter, 87 N. Y. 3So.
S7Loeb e. Barris. So N. J. L 382.
William P. O'Connor. holding a powei of attorney from Elizabeth McColgan. to lease
any poperty which &he owned individually, or as executrix of her husband, John
McColgan. made a lease, in her behalf. as ."William P. O'Connor. as agent for Est. of
John McColsan. as landlord." and signed and sealed it "William P. O'Connor. agent."
ifeld, that Elizabeth McColpn could not bring an action on the lease, as, in view of its
form and of the manner of Its execution, she was a stranger to it: McColgan V. Katz,
aq N. Y. Misc. s36, 6o N. Y. Supp. rgi.
Where a lease was bade "between W. G. M.. for himself and as agent of E. L S.,
A. R. B. and L. V. U., party of the first part." the covenants being made to and by
"aid Party of the first prt," and the lease was signed "W. Q. M., Seal," it was held
to be the lease of V. G. M. personally and that E. L S., A. R. B. and L. V. U.
could not sue upon it: Harms iv. McCormick. 132 IlL bo. 22 N. E. Sit.
Lesuee of Clarke v. Courtney (83). S Pet. (U. S.) 350.
a 2 East 142.
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Wilks' (Seal). The. court of King's bench decided that the deed
was well executed in the.name of Browne. This decision has never
been overruled, but has always been regarded as rightly made.""0§ 19. So where the operative clauses of a deed were in the name of
the corporation "by William Wallace, their agent," and the covenants
were in the name of the corporation, but.the signature was "William
Wallace, Agent for the Flower Brook Manufacturing Company,"
the court held that the deed must be considered the deed of the
corporation. 1
And wherr a contract under seal was made "between the C. I. Co.
party of the first part by J. S. B. agent, and J. K. B. and E. C. B.,.
parties of the second part ;" the stipulations in the contract purport-
ing to be between "the said party of the first part" and "the said
parties of the second part," no names being given, and concluded,
"In witness whereof the parties have hereunto affixed their hands
and seals," and was signed "J. S. B. Agent (L s.), J. K. B. (L. s.),
E. C. B. (L- s.)," it was held to be the deed of the company."2
§ 20. In the cases cited in the two precedtng sections it will be
noticed that the respective instruments purported to be made by and
in the name of the principal. But where a bond beginning "I
promise to pay," etc., and not mentioning any obligor's name, was
signed, "Witness my band and seal, H. S. Lucas, (Seal) for Charles
Callender," the Supreme Court of North Carolina held Lucas per-
sonally responsible." And so where a bond was signed "Thomas
Dix, acting for James Dix," Chief Justice .RuPIN said it was
.Iunquestionably the bond of Thomas and not of James. The
former seals it and he speaks in it throughout, and the latter not at
all.""" But the same judge in pasging upon the liability of a party to
a deed says: "It is not material in what form the deed be signed,
whether A. B. by C. D. Or C. D. for A. B., prozvded it appears in the.
deed, and by the execution that it is the deed of the principal:'""
§ 21. DISTINCTION IN CASE OF PUBLIC AoENTs.-But a distinc-
" Mussey r. Scott (8$s:), 7 Cush. (Mass.) 2sS. s4 A= Dec. 719, citing Wilburn v.Larkin (:832). 3 Blacklf. (Ind.) 5; Hunter v. Miller (:846), 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 6z2. Andto the sime effect are Shanks v. Lancaster (:848), 5 Gratt. (Vs.) ito, So Am. Dec. te;
Tucker Mnfg. Co. v. Fairbanks (867). 98 Mass. ios.
' McDaniels v. Flower Brook Mnfg. Co. (,8o), az Vt. 274. See also Martin v,.Almond (1857), 25 Mo. 3t3, and Carter v. Chaudron. s Ala. 7s, where throughout
the body of the deed it purported to be between the principal and the third party, bat
was signed "S. H. G. (Seal]. attorney in fact for J. K.," it was held that the deed
was well executed as the deed of J. K., the principal.
4, Bradstreet v. Baker, 14 R. L 546. To same effect: Hancock v. Younker, 83 I1 *08;
Haven t. Adams. 4 Allen (Mass.) go.
"Bryson z,. Lucas (:38:). 84 N. C. 68o, 37 Am. Rep. 634.
"Oliver v,. Dix. : Dev. and Bat. Eq. (N. Car.) 158.
"Redmond v. Coffin, 2 Dev. Eq. (N. Car.) 437.
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tion has been iiade in the case of public agents. who have entered
into agreements. imt negotiable, for the performance of public duties.
In such a case it i. to be presume(' that they did not undertake
personally to assume the public burdens, and although they may
have entered into covenants rider seal, partaking of a personal
nature, yet where the obligation i.; known to be a public one, they
can only be held p.rsonall) bound, if at all, where the intent is clearly
apparent so to bind them. " Said Chief Justice MARSHALL: "The
intent of the officer to bind himself personally, must be very appar-
ent indeed to induce such a construction of tht; contract ;"1+ and it is
said by another learned judge that, "It is much against public policy
to cast the obligations that justly belong to the body politic upon
this class of officials.""
These cases, however, are not to be confounded with the cases
where the agents, like the trustees and officers of private corpo-
rations and religious bodies, are not public in their nature, nor with
cases of negotiable instruments, which stand upon different ground.
§ 22. WHVITIIEit N.ECESSARY THAr DEED SHOULD PURPORT TO
BE ExF.CUTED B ..X AGrNT.-Whether it is necessary to the validity
of the deed that it should on its face purport to be executed by an
agent. or whether the agent may act in the principal's-name through-
out with nothing to disclose the fact of the agency, are qtestions
which have been much discussed.
Thus In Wood v. Goodridge the agent had executed a mortgage
by simply signing the name of his principal with nothing to show
that it was signed by an agent and not by the principal in person.
FETCHER, J., was of the opinion that such a form of execution was
not- authorized, and said --
Rtdc of WIood v. Goodridg.-"It should appear upon the face
of the instruments that they were executed by the attorney, and
"lodgson v. Dexter. C ranch (U. S.) 34S (Secretary of War); Knight v. Clark.
48 N. J. L 2a. S7 Am. Rep. S34 (Township Trustees); Jones v. LeTombe. 3 Dallas
(U. S.) 384 (Consul General of France); Fox v'. Drake, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 1g1 (Court
House Commissioners). Tut v. Hobbs. t7 Mo. 486 (School Trustees); Miller v. Ford.
4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 376. SS Am. Dec. 687 (Commissioners of Roads); Simonds v,.
Heard. 23 Pick. (Mass.) 120, 34 Am. Dec. 41 (Commattee of town held to be personally
liable on the ground that the intent was clear to make them so); Brown v. Austin. I
Mass. 2o, 2 An. Dec. ts (Agent appointed to take depositions by committee of con-
gre's): McClenticks v. Bryant. t Mo. 598, 14 Am. 'Dec. 310 (Town Commissioners held
personally liable because they exceeded their authority); Belknap v,. Reinhart, 2 Wend.
(N. Y.) 375. 2o Am. Dec. 6as (Captain U. S. Army); Stinchfield v. Little. : Grecnl.
(Me.) z31. to Am. Dec. 6s; Dawes v. Jackson, 9 Mass. 490 (Superintendent of State's
Prison); Freeman v. Otis, 9 Mass. a;a. 6 Am. Dec. 66 (U. S. Collector of Customs);
Walker t. Swartwout, 1s Johns. (N. Y.) 444. 7 Am. Dec. 334 (Quartermaster General
U. S. Army); Wallis :. Johnson School Township. 7S Ind. 368 (Trustee of Schools).
In Hodgson r. Dexter. : Cranch (U. S.) 345.
" BrzsLzy. C. J.. in Knight t.. Clark. 48 N. J. L- 2. a.7 Am. Rep. 534.
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in virtue of the authority delegated to him for this purpose. It is
not enough that an attorney in fact has.authority, but it must appear
by the instruments themselves which he executes, that he intends to
execute this authority. The instruments should be made by the
attorney expressly as such attorney; and the exercise of his delegated
authority should be distinctly avowed upon the instruments them-
selves. Whatever may be the secret intent and purpose of the
attorney, or whatever may be his oral declaration or profession at
the time, he does not in fact execute the instruments as attorney,
and in the exercise of his power as attorney, unless it is so expressed
in the instruments. The instruments must speak for themelves.
Though the attorney should intend a deed to be the deed of his
principal, yet it will not be the deed of the principal, unless the
instrument purports on its face to be his deed. The authority gven
clearly is, that the attorney shall execute the deed as attorney but in
the name of the principal."" The decision in the case, however,
was placed upon other grounds.
How of this Rule.-This rule, certainly, has much to commend it,
as tending to the due and orderly execution of important instru-
ments, and as facilitating greatly the proper preservation in the
public records of the evidence of the authority and of its exercise.
But at most, it was a mere dictum in the case, and its authority has
not generally been conceded, even in its own State.50
§ 23. SAME SUBJE6T.-FURTHER OF THIS RumE.-In Forsyth
v. Day,3s speaking of this case, RicE, J., said: "No case, I appre-
hend, can be found in the books which will sustain the -rule so
broadly laid down by the learned judge in the case of Wood v. Good-
ridge. Nor can the doctrine be sustained on principle. It is difficult
to p6rceive an) sound reason why, if one man may authorize another
to act for him and bind him, he may not authorize him thus to act
for and bind him in one name as well as in another. As matter of
convenience in preserving testimony, it may be well that the names
of all the parties who are in any way connected with a written instru-
ment should appear upon the instruments themselves. But the fact
that the name of the agent by whom the signature of the principal
is affixed to an instrument, appears upon the'instrunient itself, neither
proves nor has any tendency to prove, the authority of such agent.
That must be established aliunde, whether his name appears as agent,
or whether he simply places the name of his principal to the instru-
ment to be executed." This, however, was the case of a promissory
note and not of a deed.
I (8o) 6 Cush. (Mass.) 17. 5 Am. Dec. 771-
" sHunter v. Giddings. 96 Mass. 41. 93 Am. Dec. 54.
0' (:8S6) 42 Me. 382.
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Again in Devinney v. Reynolds, s1 a deed commencing: "To all to
whom these presents shall come, Know ye that Michael Hollman by
WIlIam McAllister, his lawful and regularly deputed attorney in
fact, etc., grants," etc., concluded, "In witness whereof, the said
Michael Hollman, by his attorney aforesaid. hath hereunto set his
hand and seal," etc. To this were appended the name and seal of
Michael Hollman. Said the court: "The execution of the deed is in
proper form, and, indeed, we seldom see such instruments executed
so much in accordance with approved precedents. It would be use-
less to add the name and seal of the attorney, for it is what it purports
to be, the deed of the principal and not the attorney, and therefore
does not 'equire his name and seal, but the name avd seal of the
principal only."
§ 24. So in Berkey v. Juddt 3 a deed reciting that it was made by
the principals by their attorney in fact, was signed and sealed in the
names of the principals, followed by the words, "By their attorney in
fact." The court said: "As respects the execution of a deed by an
attorney in fact, although it is usual and better for him to sign the
name of his principal, and to add thereto his own signature, with
proper words indicating that the act is done by him as such attorney,
yet it is not in all cases necessary that he should so append his own
name. When the deed on its face purports to be the indenture of
the principal, made by his attorney in fact, therein designated by
name, it may be properly executed by such attorney by his sub-
.scribing and affixing thereto the name and seal of his principal
alone.' In this case the deed purports on its face to be the indenture
of the principals, and not that of the agent. It fully discloses that it
was made for them and in their name by their attorney in fact who
had full authority so to do. Its execution was properly acknowl-
edged by him as such attorney in fact, and for and on behalf of his
said principals. The neglect to sign his own name to the words 'by
their attorney in fact' was a purely technical omission devoid of any
legal effect whatever."
§ 25. In both of the cases last cited, however, it will be noticed
that the fact that the deed was executed by an agent appeared from
the face of the instruments.
In Wilks v. Back, " heretofore referred to, where the signature to
I (38ji) : Watts and Serg. (Penn.) 328.( 087S) 22 Minn. 287. So in Tdd v. Rines. 26 Minn. aor, it was held. that a deed
signed "A. I. (the name of the grantor). by C. D.. his attorney In fact." sufficiently
indicates that it was executed by an attorney in fact for and in the name of his principal,
without reciting that fact in the body of the deed.
"Citing Devinney v. leynolds. 3 Watts & Serg. (Penn.) J28; and Forsyth %.. Day,
41 Me. 382.
4 a East r4z.
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the instrument, which v. as an arbitration bond, was: "For James
Browne, Mathias Wilks," (Seal), LAWRENCE, J., said: "Here the
bond was executed by Wilks for and in the name of his principal;
and this is distinctly shown by the manner of making the signature.
Not even this was necessary to be shown; for if Wilks had sealed
and delivered it in the name of Browne, that would have been enough
without stating that he had so done."
Where the deed is to be signed in the presence and by the direction
of the principal, mere parol authority is, as has been seen, sufficient,;
and in such case there need be nothing in the deed to indicate that
the signature was set by an agent and not by the principal.
§ 26. SAME SuJEcT-How IN R-AsoN.-While the rule of
Wood v. Goodridge is undoubtedly well founded in convenience and
propriety, yet it is difficult in reason to perceive why even in those
cases where nothing whatever appears upon the face of the instru-
ment to indicate it, it may not be shown by evidence aliunde that it
ivas in fact executed by an agent. It cannot be said that this is to
contradict, add to or vary the deed by parol evidence, for its legal
effect remains the same, and it is none the less afterward what it
purported to be before,-the deed of the principal. Neither can it
be said that in one case there .is, while in the other there is not,
evidence of the agency. In either event the agency must be proved
as a fact. It cannot be established by mere recitals of authority or
by any pretence of acting in that capacity.
§ 27. PAROL EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO DISCHARGt; AGENT.-
Where the deed upon its face is the deed of the agent, parol evidence
is not admissible to discharge the agent by showing that it was
intended or understood to be the hIeed of the principal,50 but where
the deed is ambiguous, parol evidence may be resorted to, to show
who was in fact the party intended to be charged. 7
FLOYD R. MECHEM.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGo.
" Willis tv. Bellamy, S N. Y. Super, Ct. 373; Higgins v. Senior, 8. I. & W. 834;
Beckam v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79; Leadbitter ,. Farrow, S M. & S. 34S; Spencer ,. Field,
zo Wend. (N.Y.) 88; Townsend v. Hubbard, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 3St; Briggs v. Partridge. 64
N. Y. 3S7. 21 Am. Rep. 637.
't Shuetie t. Bailey, 40 Mo. 69; Smith v. Alexander, 3: Mo. :93.-
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